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Abstract: Issues of the truth potential of religions and its alleged incompatibility with scientific 
objectivity are among the questions that cannot be bypassed in discourses aiming to an integral 
understanding of society. In this paper, we will examine and compare two specific approaches that 
share the intention of taking into consideration religious truths when describing and criticising both 
modern societies and methods permitting their scientific examination within the academic field. As 
perennialism focuses on common metaphysical truth shared by all religions, and post-secularism 
deals with a possible form of cooperation between secular and religious morality, it is expected to 
find that their offered solutions to social crisis phenomena will be essentially different. However, the 
results show that basically both see the solution as a reorganizational task. 
Keywords: Perennialism, post-secularism, society, social crisis, scientific objectivity
The Fundamental Question
In recent decades, scientific opinions about the presence of religious ideas in society and politics 
have been radically reassessed, which, in turn, undermined the interpretation of religion as „a pri-
vate matter” (Luckman, 1967: 94). One of the central components of the reassessment process is 
the recognition of the truth potential of religion and religious values. Another question is how this 
conviction of their truth potential is compatible with scientific objectivity, a classical debate which 
had a non-negligible effect on a special segment of the social public sphere, namely: academic 
knowledge. Taking into consideration that religious ideas and values participate in a significantly 
different, i.e. „foreign” public sphere from the one they did in the ages before the separation of 
state and Church, in this paper I would like to concentrate on the following question: to what extent 
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could the identity of these ideas and values be preserved in its reconciliation with scientific objectiv-
ity? For this examination I have selected two different approaches to social crises. The first of them 
is the perennial approach, which can be connected to such names as René Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, 
Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, Titus Burckhardt, and Martin Lings, or more recently, with more 
potential of academic objectivity, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Rodney Blackhirst, Harry Oldmeadow, and 
Patrick Laude. The second is the post-secular approach, as identified, for example, with the work 
of Jürgen Habermas, Maeve Coke, and Christina Lafont. The reason for this choice is that while the 
former approach interprets religious truths as an expression of „absolute” metaphysical truths in 
themselves, the latter makes the subject of its research the social utility of religious truths exclusively 
from a humanist and rationalist point of view. Another reason for the choice is the fact that the so-
cial view of perennialism for the first look – similarly to other religious and ideological approaches – 
does not meet the criteria of an unbiased and value-free approach. However, it is also easily detect-
able in the post-secular approach that in the interaction of religious and secular citizens, there exists 
an attempt for a normative construction of knowledge which is not restricted to the description 
and critique of phenomena (as things are) but above this, correct actions are designated (as things 
should be). For this reason, in both cases, it occurs to the writer that despite their objectivation in 
the Bourdieuian sense, neither can be regarded as a scientifically objective approach.
The Problem of Scientific Objectivity and the Objectivity of the Subject
For reasons of length, this study does not allow for a detailed examination of the objectivity of 
social sciences. However, two observations can be made even without a detailed analysis. The first 
is in C.W. Mills’s words, that „the social scientist at work is not suddenly confronted with the need 
to choose values. He is already working on the basis of certain values.” (1959, 178), which can be 
interpreted in the following way: inside social sciences, the set of value choices is determined by su-
per-values, coded into generally accepted „scientific” approaches. However, it can be put in a more 
generic way, as it is hard to debate that every thought, observation, and description is determined 
by a priori values, and for this reason, the realization of an absolutely idealized „value-free” science 
would be committed to the special value of value-free-ness. The second observation is that al-
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though several researchers have already attempted to deal with the problem of a value-free science 
(a few among them for example are Florian Znaniecki, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Alwin W. Gouldner, Robert 
A. Nisbet, and Irving L. Horowitz), „It is not that the relevant arguments articulated by this minority 
have been answered. Rather, they generally have been ignored” (Gray 1968: 176). This situation, 
which has not changed significantly to our days, can be explained with the characteristic of power 
discourses. However, such an explanation will not point at the solution of the problem, only at its 
discursive illegitimacy, which lends a degree of incoherence even to the basic texts of social sciences, 
as objectivity and its criteria did not mean even in classical sociology that the „social” aspect was 
dealt with without previous assumptions. Auguste Comte sided with „mere” empiricism – where 
he deems empirical research which is conducted in the absence of theory unscientific1 – which is in 
harmony with Max Weber’s statements that „no science is absolutely free from presuppositions” 
(1991: 153) and „an attitude of moral indifference [Gesinnungslosigkeit] has no connection with 
scientific ‘objectivity’” (2011: 60). Weber’s criteria for the objectivity of empirical knowledge are that 
the effects of the scientist’s previous assumptions and convictions can be and are made predictable, 
and, as a result, the interpretation of scientific facts is not mixed with evaluative discussion.
The thought ordering of empirical reality along subjective categories denies neither a priori as-
sumptions nor the fact that observed phenomena can have other aspects than social, which can also 
be researched according to their patterns of regularity and even according to scientific demands. At 
the same time, it states, showing the characteristics of an ideology critique that scientific knowledge 
is not compatible with normative knowledge, which aims at the identification of criteria needed for 
successful life management.2 The formation of a value-free and non-normative sociology makes the 
values that social scientists hold irrelevant from a scientific point of view and excludes both „viable 
social philosophies” and research for better forms of human organization from the field of sociology 
(Warburton 1977: 91).
1  As Comte (2009) wrote, „No logical dogma could be more thoroughly irreconcilable with the spirit of the positive philosophy, 
or with its special character in regard to the study of social phenomena, than this [empiricism]”, „which is introduced into it 
[observation] by those who, in the name of impartiality, would interdict the use of any theory whatever” (474).
2  The difference between a normative and an existential form of knowledge can lead to several questions, e.g about the objectivity of 
a Marxist or Durkheimian sociology, as the concepts concerning logic and objectivity can be radically different, for example, as in 
logical positivism and in the Peircian normative logic.
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At the same time, Habermas (1973) recognized that the positivist struggle against dogmatism is 
only possible in a form of science which reflects only on itself and wills itself as an end, that is, it 
shows exactly the characteristics of that kind of dedicated rationality3 which he rejects (268).  As 
long as theoretical commitment to rationality does not prevent the scientific nature of a discipline, 
logically theoretical commitments to postulates of a different type (e.g. theological or transcenden-
tal) cannot be in themselves obstacles to the scientific nature of a discipline either. The question of 
objectivity follows only after that, and for exactly this reason – because of different postulates – the 
criteria of the various commitments will not overlap. The sociological relevance of religious truths 
viewed in the light of the criteria required by scientific objectivity meets the difficulty, as an example, 
that religious teachings do not trace back fact statements about the world to observations, instead 
they formulate the general laws of the world in accordance with divine revelations. This difference, 
however, is a consequence of theological postulates, and thus, the difficulty does not imply the 
incoherence of „thought ordering” but only that statements formed via scientific observations are 
coherent with a different type of commitment.
According to this, the objectivity of religious truths can be described as a special type of „subjec-
tive objectivity” in the same way as the objectivity of social sciences. The difference between the 
two is that the former is always the objectivity of the unique and supreme Subject, who can claim 
„objectivity” through an order and law of objectivation as Being, and not according to the logical 
control researchers practise over their individual viewpoints when they arrange the examination of 
individual items. The answer to the question which of these two options can be accepted in a given 
discourse universe as fact depends on the power logic inside and the positions of their agents. In 
our opinion, a study of perennialist and post-secular approaches to society and their comparison 
makes it possible to explore the history of discursive skirmishes along this power logic: the surfacing 
of a problem, namely, whether the truth potential of religion or religious values can be accepted 
scientifically, gives us an opportunity to reconsider the components of the problem.
3 Earlier, Polányi (1950) has also pointed out this self-referential paradox in connection with the enlightened-superstitious opposition (76).
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The Starting Point of Reconsideration
The novelty in a reconsideration of this type can be a result of the re-structuralization of current 
commitments, the extension of their scope, or both. Another consequence can be that the thinking 
agent selects a new object while the fact of commitment to the object cannot be eliminated. The 
latter is more complicated because it cannot be excluded that the reconsideration of components 
constituting the problem may not happen according to the paradigms recognized and accepted 
by the academia but for example according to those of theological tradition, or in a way which is 
compatible with that tradition. Thus, when we are examining how phenomena and the relationship 
between them get objectivized in science, we also have to look into the question what doctrines 
these concepts fit in and what tradition they are based on. Doctrines and schools of thought are of 
various types, and are different not only in the degree of their institutionalization or in their methods 
of passing their knowledge to the next generation, but very often the phenomena they examine are 
also interpreted as the revelation of a different basic characteristic. This is basically equivalent to the 
statement that it is always the doctrine that determines the object of examination and the questions 
that can be asked about it, and, to a certain extent, the range of possible results and conclusions.4 
This is true for theology as well as for the constitutive models of social sciences, where groups of 
phenomena, as possible objects of study, are „offered„ in their empirical connectedness to experi-
ence (Foucault 1966: 368). From this, however, it cannot be concluded that a theological reconsid-
eration of the facts makes it automatically irrelevant from the viewpoint of social sciences; this can 
be stated or denied only after the comparison of concepts. Taking into consideration the results of 
Christian social thought, the claim may also seem justified that some elements and relationships of 
society can be re-considered with theological commitment in a way that they may remain easily 
manageable by the means of interdisciplinary social sciences. 
The questions above are worthy of special attention when examining society because what has 
been attributed by the post-secular approach to the incompatibility of the organizing principles of 
globality with human environment – an issue inseparable from social justice – has been attempted 
4 To illustrate this point, it is enough to think of how the meaning of „human” has changed according its interpretation inside the 
bounds of systems of thought in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, or for that matter, in trans- and post-humanist 
thought. Moreover, the definitions and interpretations are often exclusive of each other.
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to handle until recently mainly by secular types of knowledge within the academic field, without any 
regard to the so-called „religious truths”. Although western theology has made several attempts in 
late modernity, at the recognition of the results of secular science (a controversial gesture), the same 
cannot be said of the academia as a group: it has made no attempt to benefit from the study of 
theology (Yarnold 1959: 54). On the part of social sciences an early recognition of the principle that 
„no science can prove its fundamental value to the person who rejects these [its] presuppositions„ 
(Weber 1991: 153) surely contributed to this situation. It is only since the turn of the millennium that 
alternatives to the preservation of the status quo have strengthened. These alternatives converge 
– which occasionally seem to originate from inside the hermeneutical horizon of religions – in that 
respect that they no longer observe religion’s role in social and attitudinal organization through a 
sociological filter, but under the sign of dialogue and mutual understanding, regarding the aca-
demic and scientific value of possible conclusions as potentially equivalent. In political philosophy, 
some of these approaches refer to post-secular society, where the „post„ prefix means that it has 
abandoned the „militant secularism„ (Braeckman 2009: 280) of its modern precursor and, further-
more, it does not insist on the categorization of religion as a private matter but leaves space to its 
more emphatic appearance in the public sphere. On the other hand, there are areas – not necessar-
ily in the geographical sense –, where the Western type of science, based on logical positivism and 
empiricism has not become a dominant factor in the explanation of the world, and in this way they 
not only lack a quasi-exclusive position but neither are their role significant in the organization of 
human coexistence, or in determining the criteria for „scientific” knowledge. The non-Westernized 
part of the Islamic world belongs here, or sciences with „sacral„ foundations which no longer be-
long – or never belonged – to the scientific culture of the West. In these areas, the question never 
arises how to reconcile the religious and the secular, or the traditional and postmodern mentality, 
as it is not a problem either, whether they should attempt, from inside the society, to adopt non-
secular values or interpretations to correct particular social anomalies. The emphasis in these areas, 
where perennialism also belongs, is rather on the uncompromised rejection of secularism and the 
modern world in general. 
The post-secular and perennialist approaches, therefore, interpret the relevance of religious truths 
rather differently, partly because in their particular thought contexts the referents or the terms „so-
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ciety„ and „religious truth„ also differ. The following section will attempt to give an overview of the 
most important elements of difference.
Society from Two Perspectives
For a modern society, the first thing to be emphasized is that while the researchers are examining 
the meaning of a concept they also need to identify the referent, implicitly or explicitly, depending 
on whether they regard the meaning and the reference identical or different. Even if it is customary 
in problem-centred researches to emphasize particular aspects of society depending on their rele-
vance to a solution and to marginalize or ignore other aspects, an etymological research of what the 
term „society” refers to can be taken as a basis and can be normative for later meaning variants. As 
here we would like to concentrate on the first phenomenon it was applied to signify, we would like 
to go back to the basics of the relationship between the sign and the signified, to the circumstances 
in which it was born, and then, following that, we can concentrate, as the need arises, on various 
geographical and political spheres, or later ages, where further variants of meaning developed.
From a historical point of view, „society”, that is, the French word societé originally meant more 
of an economy-type of companionship. At the same time, based on the evolution of concepts like 
„société”, „social”, „sociabilité”, etc. (see Baker 1994: 95–121, esp. 98–108 and Mintzker 2008: 
500–513 passim.), it can be claimed that „societé” was used even before the Enlightenment to 
signify natural human companionship of mutual dependence. For an example we can quote from 
the dictionaries edited by César de Rochefort and Antoine Furetière written in 1685 and 1690, re-
spectively: the human
„is not perfect enough to be independent, but is not so imperfect either to be incapa-
ble of conversation. For this reason was he born with the commitment and relationship 
so there is no way he can exist in the world without participating in a kind of family or 
a republic. In other words, as a social and civil animal, he needs to have lots of things 
in common with all the individuals of his species, and more with whom he lives in the 
same country, and even more with whom he belongs to the same family. [n’eƒt pas 
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aƒƒez parfait pour eƒtre independant, il n’ eƒt pas auƒƒi si imparfait qu’il ƒoit incapable 
de converƒation; C’eƒt pourquoy il naiƒt avec cette obligation & ce rapport qu’il ne peut 
eƒtre en nulle part de monde ƒans eƒtre une partie de quelque famille ou quelque Re-
publique: Or en qualité d’ animale ƒociable & civil, il eƒt neceƒƒaire qu’il ait beaucoup de 
choƒes communes avec tous les individus de ƒon eƒpéce & encore plus avec ceux de ƒon 
païs & bien plus encore avec ceux de ƒa maiƒon.] (Rochefort 1685: 692).  
Later, he writes: 
„It is only God’s state that is sufficient in itself, and that of the beast, which is incapable 
of speech and, being mute and ignorant, is unable to communicate – both are outside 
the bounds of all kinds of society and community: God does not need society, and the 
beast is incapable of it.” [Il n’y a que le condition de Dieu qui ƒeul ƒuƒƒit à ƒoy-meime, & 
la condition de la beƒte qui pour etre mueƒte & ignorante ne peut communiquer ils ƒont 
tous deux, hors des liens de tout ƒocieté & communauté: Dieu n’a pas beƒoin de ƒocieté 
& la beƒte n’en eƒt pas capable.] (ibid., 692).  
„Society” is defined in the entry above as made up of people and of the conversation networks 
between them, so society has been defined in a way that it does not include either God or the 
natural world, furthermore, society itself is not a part of those either. This definition was not formed 
through some restriction of a former category but by a formerly unprecedented naming of a specific 
coexistence as „society”. Although it can be rightfully said that the societies and society-concepts 
of the Enlightenment significantly differ from those of today, the discussable differences are not, in 
my opinion, in changes in the principles above but in its sphere of validity, in its being extended to 
new areas, and through this extension, in an increased number of focus points.
Regarding these principles, a perennialist concept of society is basically constative and not con-
stitutive. It is not a construction in the postmodern sense but a conformity to narratives of various 
historical-causal chains of handing down traditions, inside the framework of which it can be stated 
what society is in essence and how it does not fit into the Divine order, and does not merely make 
available statements on what constitutes the examined object and how it functions. Here, on the 
one hand, a perennialist approach to society takes into consideration religious truths, but does it in 
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a way that at the same time it regards them as an expression of the meta-narrative of a „primordial 
tradition” in that particular religious language and system of symbols, laws, and rites. On the other 
hand, based on these truths, it relates to modern society as to an anti-traditional, godless organiza-
tion, which necessarily draws upon itself a rejection of its „rebellious” spirituality, where the coexist-
ence of humans has been attempted through a break with the divine, and via the maintenance of 
this separation.
This, however, does not mean that perennialism rejects every form of human coexistence. Peren-
nialism puts a clear emphasis on the primacy of the individual when it is for spiritual realization. The 
turn towards the Self – that is, to the Absolute Subject – always starts on the individual level, where 
it requires a special activity on the part of the individual, besides which it also postulates that the 
individual can only be a fragmentary reflection of the Self. For reasons of self-correction, the indi-
vidual needs to be united with his/her fellow human beings, on the one hand to remind themselves 
of their fragmentary nature (multitude in oneness), and on the other hand, as a communal act of 
fitting oneself into a divine cosmic order (unity in multitude), which includes both keeping in touch 
with other individuals and turning towards God together with other individuals. From the peren-
nialist perspective, positive and appreciative statements can be made about forms of coexistence 
fulfilling the criteria mentioned above, for example, about congregations, monastic communities, 
classical teacher-disciple relationships, and in general about any affectionate connection between 
people in a narrower or broader sense. However, in general, the concepts used by perennialism to 
describe the different types of human coexistence show an inconsistency which leads to problems 
in cases when their relevance to social sciences is examined. Social development, as it can be seen 
in the light of the early usage of the term, is strongly connected to the results of an unfolding 
secularism, but this stage of development could not be reached while the organising power of re-
ligion covered every aspect of human existence. Thus, the special mode of coexistence we can call 
„society” was absolutely unknown to people of yore. Despite this, archaic ways of coexistence are 
quite commonly referred to in perennialist texts as „sacral society”, „religious society”, or perhaps 
„traditional society” – as an example, see Coomaraswamy (2005: 141, 2011: 25 and 70); Lakhani 
(2010: 13 and 190); Schuon (2006: 101) and Stoddart (2008: 100) –, which shows that perennialism 
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actually uses a modern concept signifying a level of godless organization to speak about modes of 
coexistence which cannot be furthest from that.5
This may be problematic for various reasons. Firstly, based on the guidelines of conceptual clar-
ity it can be a requirement in science that different phenomena or their groups should not be 
categorized under the same name. The principles forming and maintaining societies by definition 
are human constructs, in their aims, norms, values, desires, faiths and beliefs, for which reason 
their organization is significantly different from that of religious communities, which are postulated 
as god-centred and maintained by divine providence. On the conceptual horizon of society, the 
existential difference between these two modes of coexistence may remain hidden from research-
ers, as society itself is also a mode of coexistence of special quality. And as the difference remains 
hidden, it will be impossible to distinguish between them according to their essence, only by their 
structure and function: with one mode of coexistence having god-based organizational principles 
(conforming to various revelations or to sacral laws) and with the other one not god-based, which, if 
researchers want to proceed in a coherent manner, is not acceptable because the term is reductive: 
it does not say that human coexistence has this and that (social and communal) modes, but that 
one mode of coexistence (society) has different qualities (traditional, religious, modern, global, etc.).
The other problem is that according to the perennialist thought, there is really no thing that is 
profane, there is only a profane point of view (Guénon 2001: 53), which means that although the 
viewpoint can be called profane – not in its own right but by opposing the transcendent and the 
sacral – due to its opposition as a distinguishing feature, the realization of the „profane” will not be 
so profane but untraditional instead, it will not be something new but a degradation of something. 
Thus, when perennialism uses the name „society” to denote a godless mode of coexistence ac-
cording to its own logic, it refers to a deteriorated sacral community, the organizational principle of 
which is the negation of those of sacral communities. This way, the difference is not between the 
duality of traditional and modern societies, but of traditional and deteriorated sacral communities; 
the latter of which can be called society because of this deterioration. These differences are dif-
5 The interpretation of archaic and modern modes of coexistence as „societies” of different quality can be seen in the following 
extract „Guénon also stressed that any traditional society , such as still survived in the East, is oriented to spiritual ends whilst any 
anti-traditional society, found everywhere in the modern West is necessarily governed by values inimical to our spiritual warfare” 
(Oldmeadow 2007, ix).
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ficult to perceive if we speak of both traditional-religious and modern-global modes of coexistence 
as society. It is necessary to highlight the polysemy of the applied concepts because their use may 
reach a degree of obscurity where the identification of the entity they signify becomes difficult or 
impossible and this clarification will be necessary in the examination of the concept of religion of 
the post-secular discourse.
A post-secular approach to society is not constative but constitutive: it does not reject society for 
its secularity, but does not speak about religious society either, instead, it wants to find a solution 
to a social crisis of society by drawing attention to the necessity of integrating some religious values 
into society. Let us have a look at what Habermas thinks of this cooperation: He does not simply 
state that religion has the right to spell out some truths, but also describes what consequence this 
will bring into the interaction of religious and secular citizens:
„The expectation that there will be continuing disagreement between faith and knowl-
edge deserves to be called ‘rational’ only when secular knowledge, too, grants that reli-
gious convictions have an epistemological status that is not purely and simply irrational. 
And this is why, in the public political arena, naturalistic world views, which owe their 
genesis to a speculative assimilation of scientific information and are relevant to the 
ethical understanding of the citizens, do not in the least enjoy a prima facie advantage 
over competing world views or religious understandings. The neutrality of the state 
authority on questions of world views guarantees the same ethical freedom for every 
citizen. This is incompatible with the political universalisation of a secularist world view. 
When secularized citizens act in their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny 
in principle that religious images of the world have the potential to express truth. Nor 
must they refuse their believing fellow citizens the right to make contributions in a reli-
gious language to public debates. Indeed, a liberal political culture can expect that the 
secularized citizens play their part in the endeavours to translate relevant contributions 
from the religious language into a language that is accessible to the public as a whole” 
(Habermas–Ratzinger 2006: 50–52).
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The extract above can be interpreted as if Habermas could accept, both epistemologically („have an 
epistemological status that is not purely and simply irrational”) and gnoseologically („must not deny 
in principle that religious images of the world have the potential to express truth”), the restoration of 
religious truths into the status which they enjoyed in the better part of history and later he describes its 
cultural, political, legal, and moral implications. Habermas’s concept of religion is worth a detailed in-
spection, however, in order to understand what he means when he says that the secular citizen should 
not question the truth potential of religious worldview. As Habermas examines the question primarily 
from a humanist’s point of view, for him, the truth potential of religion is not a temporal appearance 
of metaphysical truths but the presence of moral truths in religion which, for some reason, are absent 
from secular society. And as they are absent, he is worried that certain aspects of cultural tradition – 
moral intuitions originating in religious tradition (2005: 137) – which had attained significant success in 
handling societal pathology and individual tragedies in the religious universe, have become forgotten 
over time. We will not go into an examination whether his fears are well-founded or not, but will be 
satisfied with the conclusion that his train of thought does not handle religious truths in the same an-
thropological and ontological dimension as religion does. He moves on a plane where these truths are 
accessible to the rational mind, and standing on which human rationality constructs a humanist reality, 
separate from the transcendent. Habermas’s position, although rejecting several postulates of the En-
lightenment on religion, is still „enlightened” in the sense that he assumes that moral truths are norms 
governing individual and social interests; while from a religious point of view humanist morality is a 
secularized remainder of a true religious lifestyle. From this, it can be seen that when Habermas speaks 
about the truth potential of religion he does so inside the framework of a special (reductionist) rational 
reconstruction, the main result of which is that he introduces the reconstructed into the discourses of 
social science where a well-developed logical system and toolkit are available for its analysis.
The aforementioned can be interpreted in the following way in respect of the role of religion: What 
conditions must be fulfilled so that religions might contribute to the social stability of liberal states and 
to the consolidation of their „moral foundations”? In his response, Habermas does not commit himself 
either to the exclusivist or to the inclusivist standpoint6 but develops a solution which blurs the bound-
6 The „exclusivist” and „inclusivist” approaches here refer to the appearance of the freedom of religion in the public sphere. The former 
approach allows for the support of a standpoint by religious argumentation in public speech only if non-religious arguments are also listed to 
support the argument. The inclusivist standpoint also allows for religious arguments in public speech but without the former limitation.
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ary between a religious and a secular line of argumentation: According to the post-secular approach, 
religion can only contribute to the formation of public will and opinion in a way which is acceptable to 
the secular state, and if religious people accept certain premises of attitude when relating to the secular 
and if they select their arguments along these premises. The desirable attitudes in Habermas’s way of 
thinking are not merely about religious tolerance – with modernist overtones – (2005: 252), and we 
can add, rightly so: for religious tolerance, take it as „perseverance” or „patience”, is not value-neutral 
to the object of tolerance. A lot more is in question: The religious conscience, says Habermas (2001),
„must accede to the authority of science, which holds a social monopoly on knowledge. 
Finally, it must participate in the premises of a constitutional state, which is based on 
a non-sacred concept of morality. Without this reflective ‘thrust’, monotheisms within 
ruthlessly modernizing societies develop a destructive potential” (para.13).
In such circumstances, „acceptance” presupposes not only the equality of profane morality and 
religious truths as organising principles of coexistence, because what can be required, according to 
Habermas (2005), is a positive and successive relationship7 on the part of the believer between reli-
gious ethics and secular morality (269), which can explain to a secular citizen the absurdity of claim-
ing a morality on religious foundations irrational (114–115). By establishing this common ground 
between religious and secular morality, believers also need to accept the secular characteristics 
of society. But which are these characteristics? On the one hand, the diversity of thought, that is, 
a worldview constructed from one point of view will never belong to everyone, and therefore, it 
is neither ethical nor rational to try to achieve the opposite (Braeckman 2009: 282). On the other 
hand, the acceptance of a state the foundations of which lie on non-sacral morality, and the social 
monopoly of modern science concerning the production of knowledge, which was already touched 
upon in an earlier quotation.




As a conclusion, it can be said that there is a common intention in both the perennialist and the 
post-secular approach in taking into consideration religious truths and consequently, in strongly 
criticising modern society. Further common ground is that religious truths are justified not in the 
context of particular forms of religion. However, perennialism focuses on a common metaphysical 
truth shared by all religions, which means a transcendent unity of religions, while post-secularism 
deals with a possible form of cooperation between secular and religious morality. Both of these 
approaches share a conceptual inaccuracy as well, when they neglect the self-determination of the 
referent while referring to it, which is the case with „society” in perennialism and „religious truths” 
in post-secularism. At the same time, there is a huge difference in their approach to the crisis of so-
ciety, namely, post-secularity seeks a solution to the interior crisis phenomena of society and wishes 
to solve them as a reorganizational task, while perennialism sees society itself as a crisis phenom-
enon and therefore rejects it, promoting traditional modes of coexistence as the ideal solution.
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